



DNS in times of COVID-19 ccTLD experience

24 June 2020

Housekeeping rules





https://cdn.emojidex.com/emoji/seal/female_police_officer.png

Please type your questions in Q&A pod.

- \star Text written in the chat <u>will not be read aloud</u>.
 - Chat sessions are archived.
 - Moderator and remote participation manager will manage the queue.
 - This meeting is governed under ICANN's Expected Standard of Behavior.

http://www.icann.org/en/news/in-focus/accountability/expected-standards



Welcome





Alejandra Reynoso (.gt)

Summary

- ★ ICANN 66 Montréal
 - Plenary "DNS Abuse" ICANN 66
 - "DNS Abuse prevention system"
 by EURid (ccTLD news)
- ICANN 67 Cancún
- ★ ICANN 68 Kuala Lumpur (virtual)
 - Emphasis COVID-19



Agenda



- ★ Part 1 [60 min] Impact of COVID-19
- TLD-OPS business continuity and disaster recovery playbook
- Running a ccTLD in crisis mode
- ccNSO Internet Governance Liaison Committee (IGLC) contribution on capacity building

★ 15 min break



- ★ Part 2 [75 min] DNS Abuse
- What is DNS Abuse and why is it relevant to ccTLD managers?
- COVID-19 issues from an ICANN perspective
- Panel discussion

Part 1 - Impact of COVID-19



TLD-OPS Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery Playbook.



Jacques Latour (.ca)



Régis Massé (.fr)



Alejandra Reynoso (.gt)



Barbara Povše (.si)



Patricio Poblete (.cl)

Running a ccTLD in crisis mode: from the 2019 political upheaval to the 2020 pandemic.



Pierre Bonis (.fr)

Internet Governance Liaison Committee (IGLC) contribution on capacity building.



ccTLD Security and Stability Together



TLD-OPS DNS in times of COVID-19: the ccTLD experience

June 23, 2020 ICANN68, Remote

Jacques Latour, .ca (Chair) Régis Massé, .fr (Vice Chair)



Ahhh!! Not another boring TLD-OPS update! Remote! In the middle of the night!!!!

• What can I do:

A. Run away B. Sleep C. Daydream D. Play solitaire







E. The best you can do stay awake!



TLD-OPS Standing Committee

DR/BCP - Drafting Team Status: Success

• Dirk Jumpertz, .EU, was unanimously approved as DR/BCP Drafting Team fearless leader and outstanding contributor to the DR/BCP plan :-)







DR/BCP Table Top eXercise (TTX) Workshop @ ICANN66 Montreal

- Simulate a registry compromise
- Test the DR/BCP Playbook against the scenario
- Update the DR/BCP Playbook against the gaps, observations and lessons learned
- ~30 different ccTLDs attended





Even working during the break 😅









Workshop Document Templates



TLD-OPS Standing Committee

Table Top Exercise (TTX)

Scenario of the exercise

ROUND 1: input

FRI, 05:00 PM

- a security researcher contacts the general manager of the registry operator that he found evidence on pastebin of an excerpt of a database that seems to point to the registry's extranet used by their registrars.
- the researcher checked the hashed passwords on pastebin and managed to quite easily "crack" some of the passwords. As expected "password123" is quite common. He confirms that he logged on to the registrar extranet at some specific times (he gives those times to the manager).
- the pastebin is still online and the researcher also found some evidence that someone is selling the credentials on the dark web.
- he believes there is sufficient evidence to assume someone hacked the registry and that the malicious actor has started to cash in on his handiwork.

This is the initial information received by the registry. How will the manager react, what will he/she do? From here the manager must be fed with some additional information depending on his course of action. Remember to keep an eye on the clock. The participants have only 15 minutes per round.



Table Top Exercise (TTX)

ROUND 2: input

FRI, 08:00 PM

- 3 hours have passed since the initial discovery
- someone tweets the link to another pastebin with the hashtag #freeDomains4All #longLive.OK; it's a copy of the original pastebin.
- the tweet gets picked up and retweeted; the hashtag is amended with #itWorks.

ROUND 3: input

FRI, 10:00 PM

- 2 hours have passed
- the registry operator is contacted by the press, they want to know what's going on and ask for a formal statement.
- the registry operator's manager gets a phone call from the national television.
- the engineers are still looking into the matter, but haven't found yet where the leak came from.

BONUS ROUND: input (10 minutes before the end of the round)

To make the exercise extra interesting, additional information can be injected. In real life, events do not follow a predictable pattern, certainly not during a crisis. Bonus rounds only deliver additional information that needs to be parsed and acted upon before the end of the round.

- the engineers have some good and some really bad news.
- they have found were the hackers had entered the system and traced what has changed.
- they also noticed that more than 50k additional domain names had been registered and an undefined number of existing domain names had been altered; some of them are high profile domain names.
- they suggest to roll back the DNS and reach out to the major Internet Service Providers to reload their resolvers



Table Top Exercise (TTX)

ROUND 4: input and final round

SAT: 06:00 AM

- 8 hours have passed
- the national CERT contacts the registry operator; they have received some intelligence about the origin of the attack
- the social media of the registry operator are bombarded with questions by concerned domain name holders and registrars
- the generic mailboxes have exploded with more than 5.000 email received
- the media contacts the registry operator again for updates and are asking why it is taking so long to fix the issue
- the relevant supervising ministry (e.g. telecommunications) is contacting the registry operator's general manager, they want status updates and a debriefing of the impact of the incident



DR/BCP Playing Cards – Big Success!






DR/BCP Playing Cards – Big Success!





TLD-OPS Standing Committee





Ressources & Contacts



http://ccnso.icann.org/resources/tld-ops-secure-communication.htm





ccTLD Security and Stability Together



Thank you!



Part 1 - Impact of COVID-19



TLD-OPS Business Continuity / Disaster Recovery Playbook.



Jacques Latour (.ca)

Régis Massé (.fr)

Alejandra Reynoso (.gt)

Barbara Povše (.si)



Part 1 - Impact of COVID-19

- Fri 06/Mar Guatemala declares state of calamity. \mathbf{x}
- Wed 11/Mar Exercise: One page Business Continuity Plan. 😌
- Fri 13/Mar 1st COVID-19 case in Guatemala.
- Mon 16/Mar Schools and universities closed.
- Tue 17/Mar All operations are being done remotely. \star
- Documentation is being built: \star
 - Business Continuity Plan 76 pages so far Ο
 - **Risk Assessment & Management of 18 risks**
 - 11 BC Plans Most likely to happen
 - 4 Protocols
 - Procedures 51 pages so far Ο









Part 2 - Impact of COVID-19



- ★ Information Security Policies for the Registry based on ISO27001
- ★ Tue 17/Dec 19: Registry.si Team used TLD-OPS Playbook and played a game
- ★ Thu 27/Feb 20 1st BCP: Epidemic
- ★ Fri 13/Mar Slovenia declares state of calamity.
- ★ Mon 16/Mar Schools and universities closed.
- ★ Mon 17/Mar All operations are being done remotely.
- ★ No major issues,

still developing BCM and different BCPs







Part 1 - Impact of COVID-19



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Patricio Poblete (.cl)

Running a ccTLD in crisis mode: from the 2019 political upheaval to the 2020 pandemic.




Pierre Bonis (.fr)

Internet Governance Liaison Committee (IGLC) contribution on capacity building.



Running a ccTLD in Crisis mode: From the political upheaval of 2019 to the pandemic of 2020

Patricio Poblete ccNSO Members Meeting ICANN68 June 24, 2020



From October 18, 2019, people in Chile participated in huge protests against social inequality and in demand of political reforms

This lasted until the end of the year

There were many massive peaceful marches



But also violent protests, arsonand looting



And many cases of police abuse and violation of human rights



It all started when the Metro fare in Santiago was raised from 800 to 830 pesos (an increase of 4 cents US)



Students from schools downtown started protesting in Metro stations against the hike



Protests were violently repressed by the police



Then students called for massive fare evasions on October 18



Retira aquí tu Tarieta Adulto

Many turnstiles were vandalized =

B



Trains were stopped by people sitting at the edge



All Metro operations were suspended mid-afternoon eaving millions stranded and the city quickly became chaotic




Dozens of Metro stations were destroyed by fire



On the night of October 18, we learned that a large building was burning two blocks from NIC Chile offices






nic±chile

SOMOS EL PUNTO CL

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SOMOS EL PUNTO CL

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Our neighborhood often resembled a battlefield.

Our priorities: Keep our people safe & Keep our services operating normally, as much as possible



Domain name resolution was not at risk




nic±chile

Registry and registrar services were distributed in several data centers, some outside Santiago



The economy felt the impact



Anticipating customers could have trouble paying for renewals, we temporarily suspended deactivating unpaid domains We dropped that measure after seeing that renewals seemed normal

We decided to have most of our staff work from home

But we were not ready to do it for everyone. Some had to come to the office

Help desk phones could only be answered from the office

Accounting transactions had to be filed daily and involved submitting paperwork




Public transportation was unreliable and often unavailable

Some of our staff lived close enough to arrive on foot, if needed

For others, we hired taxi services

Workdays often had to be cut short because of unsafe situations nearby





Communicating with our users was key

We issued almost daily announcements of our hours of help desk operation, through our web site, twitter and Facebook

We also reminded them that all online services continued operating normally

Good internal communications were also crucial



UC

Manco

BREEF

FERIA CHILENA DEL LIBRO By year end, most businesses had adapted enc

BANCO EDWARDS



ABIERTO

I want a more that

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We learned some lessons:

When the COVID-19 crisis came, we were much better prepared

Our help desk staff could take calls from anywhere with their laptops

We had purchased equipment to support work from home for everybody

The university administration accepted electronic submissions for (almost) all accounting transactions, and kept improving



Very important: support people working from home

Keep improving their workspaces at home

Via Zoom: morning "coffee breaks" and afternoon "active breaks" with a physical trainer



Working at home, juggling domestic tasks and homeschooling children is very stressful Much more so if close family of friends fall ill

We provide psychological counseling for everyone who needs it

Never let a good crisis go to waste

You'll be better prepared for the next one

Thanks!



Part 1 - Impact of COVID-19



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Internet Governance Liaison Committee (IGLC) contribution on capacity building.

Capacity building : Effects of the lockdown on ccTLDs ?


ICANN68 | Pierre Bonis (IGLC Chair)

Which of the IG topics relevant to ccTLDs are being addressed?



A quick survey among IGLC members

Answers from AF, AP, EU and NA regions. extracts



My ccTLD currently performs capacity building activities.


Why are we into capacity building activities? (some answers)

- It's our mission (in our bylaws).
- It's expected from our stakeholders.
- It's a way to promote the usage of domain names
- to develop commercial services
- allow the staff and the Registry itself to achieve its goals
- To ensure the smooth functioning of the domain name system.

To whom is it targeted?

- internal staff
- potential future registrants
- government
- registrars
- registrants

Did you notice an increase in capacity building activities by your registry, during the COVID-19 pandemic?



Expectations from stakeholders during the crisis (discussion, not in the survey)

- Cybersecurity advices and training
- Online presence (registering, website building...)
- How to fight abuse on the Internet? (especially COVID-19 related)...

The impact of the lock down

- Obviously, most of in praesentia events were cancelled but :
 - Webinars enormous success
 - Guides, publications from ccTLDs were searched and (sometimes) read.
 - Support had to answer questions in a more "capacity building" approach, and less "technical support", for those who run a support not only to the registrars but also to the registrants

Any lessons to learn?

- Greater audience online (huge load for the staff, but easier to attend for the audience).
- In times of fear and questions, ccTLDs are even more seen as a neutral and professional source of expertise (even from the press !)
- How can we build on that ?

You have the floor!

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https://www.pepperlaw.com/resources/jpg/blog_post_photo_5231.jpg



ICANN

Part 2 - DNS Abuse





Nick Wenban-Smith (.uk) Moderator of Panel




John Crain (ICANN Org.) COVID-19 related issues

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Regional Organizations



Barrack Otieno (AFTLD)



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Peter Van Roste (CENTR)



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It seems obvious, but ...

- What is illegal offline is illegal online
- There are specific examples of use of domain names which are universally agreed as "abusive"*
 - Phishing
 - Malware distribution
 - Pharming
 - Botnets
 - Spam (when as a vector for the above)
- *See Internet and Jurisdiction Operational Approaches, Norms, Criteria and Mechanisms





What is more difficult is when it is alleged that a domain name has been used to commit a crime ...

- In which jurisdiction?
- What type of crime?
- Child Sexual Abuse Material is illegal everywhere, so what is the justification for any ccTLD to tolerate having a domain name associated with such content?
- So now it is ok for the registry to have policies in relation to content ...





There is no universal standard!

- Incitement to violence, terrorism
- Sales of counterfeit medicines cures for Covid 19
- Infringement of intellectual property
- Political dissent
- Freedom of expression, criticism of a company or religion
- Propagation of "harmful" material: anti-vaccination





Registries are policing the internet!





Why is this important for ccTLDs?

- ccTLDs uniquely connect to their countries/ territories
- We pride ourselves on our diversity and independence
- Nobody tells us what to do ...





Why is this important for ccTLDs?

- We are expected to add value and to protect our communities
- (Especially in times of crisis)
- If we cannot perform some basic functions competently then that opens to the door to a number of undesirable outcomes ...
 - Legislation ...
 - Regulation ...
 - Direct intervention ...
 - Loss of role ...





COVID-19, What we see

John Crain john.crain@icann.org ICANN SSR


- Big events have associated bursts of domain name registration
- COVID-19 no different
 - The extra related stress, worry and working from home makes it the perfect storm



Context

TLP: White


Domain trends update



(Source: John Conwell, DomainTools)




- Our approach for identification:
 - Pandemic-related keyword search within zone files (gTLDs + a few ccTLDs)






How many domains have we identified?

 662,111 domains were identified since January 2020







What keywords do these domains contain?



- 4 keywords account for 73% of the domains
- Different keywords categories:
 - Disease name (covid, ncov, sars, ...)
 - Pandemic countermeasures (mask, lockdown, quarantine,...)
 - Collateral (zoom, webex, conference, ...)
- Significant number of domains matches non-English terms





Language	%Domains
English	94,21%
German	2,13%
French	1,26%
Spanish	0,71%
Dutch	0,68%
Turkish	0,59%
Italian	0,14%
Hindi	0,11%
Malay	0,08%
Japanese	0,04%
Portuguese	0,02%
Chinese	0,02%




This is "data", not "intelligence"

There will be benign domains, unrelated domains, defensive registrations, parked domains... along with anything malicious

What evidence can we find, do we trust it?




API calls – VirusTotal





API calls - AlienVaultOTX





API calls - phishtank

PhishTank is operated by <u>OpenDNS</u> , a free service that makes your Internet safer, faster, and smarter. <u>Get started today</u>	Signed in: <u>sionlloyd</u> <u>My Account</u> <u>Sign Out</u>
Home Add A Phish Verify A Phish Phish Search Stats FAQ Developers Mailing Lists My Account	
Submission #6604832 is currently ONLINE Submitted May 31st 2020 9:02 PM by <u>N1Antifraude</u> (Current time: Jun 1st 2020 11:17 AM UTC)	
Werified: Is a phish Next unverified phish > As verified by paulch NotBuyingIt Vasily1 emidaniel Romantic kiss PhishKiller73	
Is a phish 100% Is NOT a phish 0%	
Screenshot of site View site in frame View technical details View site in new window D	Something wrong with this submission?
Bancolombia Sucursal Virtual Personas	
Usuario Si no tienes un usuario asignado ingresa con tu documento de identidad Ingresa tu usuario Usa Ia Clave Dinámica	



API calls – google safe browsing



The site ahead contains malware

Attackers currently on **malware.testing.google.test** might attempt to install dangerous programs on your computer that steal or delete your information (for example, photos, passwords, messages, and credit cards).


Automatically report details of possible security incidents to Google. <u>Privacy policy</u>

Details

Back to safety



Reporting Data Flow





Roughly an order of magnitude lost at each gate:

- Thousands of registrations per day
- Some reports on hundreds
- Sufficient evidence on tens



Conclusion



There is definitely bad stuff out there!

BUT; it is not anywhere near the levels that some figures would suggest



Part 2 - DNS Abuse





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
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24 June 2020

Housekeeping rules





https://cdn.emojidex.com/emoji/seal/female_police_officer.png

×

★ Please type your questions/comments in chat:

- Please use brackets around your question/comment:
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 - COMMENT> <COMMENT>
- Text outside these brackets well be considered part of "chat" and <u>will not be read aloud</u>.
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